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he seemingly never-ending theatre of the negotiations between the new Greek 
government and its international creditors – the International Monetary Fund, 
the European Central Bank and the European Commission – has now entered a 
more dangerous phase where a mistake on either side could lead to an accident. 
The IMF seems ready to throw in the towel. The latest news that the budget for this 
year threatens to go into a small primary deficit, instead of the sizeable surplus 
originally planned, adds to the exasperation on the creditors’ side. But as the Greek 
economy is tanking again, there is also a feeling in Athens that the programme 
imposed by the creditors is not working, and maybe cannot work.   
The current predicament has cemented the narrative that Greece is the victim of a 
wrong treatment, namely an excess of austerity. However, this narrative overlooks the 
fact that the approach, which is supposedly the cause of all the problems Greece is 
facing, worked in other peripheral countries. Portugal, Ireland, Spain and even 
Cyprus, are all recovering visibly. They no longer need official financing, and 
unemployment is coming down, albeit slowly and from elevated levels.  
What makes Greek different? The short answer is exports   
In all the other peripheral countries (and indeed in most of the dozens of countries 
with an IMF programme over the past decades), growing exports have provided a vital 
support, providing at least a partial offset to the reduction in demand coming from the 
government, which has to slash expenditure and increase taxes to balance its books. 
Looking at the need to re-balance the external accounts shows that the argument about 
‘self-defeating austerity’ does not make sense for Greece. In a large economy, which 
does not have problems of external financing, like the US or the euro area, one can 
certainly imagine that the attempt to lower a deficit leads to such a fall in demand and 
therefore a decline tax revenues, thereby making austerity self-defeating. But Greece 
is not in this situation. It was running very large external deficits (over 10% of GDP) 
when external finance dried up suddenly in 2008-09, forcing an adjustment in domestic 
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spending. If the Greek government had continued to spend as it had before, domestic 
demand and employment would certainly have been higher. But imports would also 
have remained much higher, and the current account would have remained in a large 
deficit. It is true that austerity caused a deep recession, but without the recession there 
would have been large external deficits. With less austerity Greece would have needed 
an even bigger bail-out (and would have an even-larger debt today). 
Export performance is thus the key to escaping the austerity trap. At first sight one 
might think that Greece is not doing so badly since overall exports have been growing 
somewhat lately. However, closer inspection reveals that this is an illusion. Most of 
the growth of exports has come from petroleum products. As Greece is not a producer 
of oil, this can only mean that Greek refineries, which have now lots of spare capacity, 
are re-exporting imported crude oil in a slightly different form. Since refinery margins 
are usually less than 5%, this means that these exports generate very little value added 
for the Greek economy. A large proportion of other exports are of a similar nature 
(metals, etc.). Moreover, the largest item in service exports, namely maritime shipping, 
also has few links with the Greek economy as this sector pays no taxes, employs few 
people (the crews are from low-wage countries) and shipping rates depend mainly on 
the global commodity cycle, which has turned down.   
The exports of manufactured goods, which create domestic value added and 
employment, are thus a small part of overall exports and a surprisingly small part of 
the overall economy, accounting for only around 12% of GDP, much less than what 
one would expect from such a small economy. 
The fact that trade accounted for such a small proportion of GDP is important because 
trade or current account deficits are usually measured as a % of GDP. But if one wants 
to measure the adjustment required from the tradable sector one should compare the 
deficit, not to GDP, but to the trade flows themselves. In the case of Greece this has 
stark implications: in 2008, the trade deficit (goods and services) amounted also to 
about 13% of GDP, higher than the weight of exports in GDP. This implies that exports 
(or rather those that should be stimulated by an internal devaluation) would have had 
to more than double in order to eliminate the external deficit if one wanted to avoid a 
fall in imports (and thus domestic demand).   
In the case of Portugal, by contrast, the trade deficit amounted to ‘only’ about one-
third of exports. Portugal thus required only an increase in exports of about one-third 
to close the external deficit, and still keep imports at the same level. This is indeed 
what happened over the last few years: Portuguese exports increased cumulatively by 
over a quarter, while imports are now at a slightly higher level than in 2007, but the 
trade balance has swung into surplus. In Greece, the trade balance has also adjusted 
(although it is not yet in surplus). However, the adjustment pattern has been the 
opposite: exports (if properly measured) have stagnated whereas imports have 
collapsed. This absence of growth in exports despite a fall in wages of over 20% is the 
real problem, not excessive austerity. If Greece had experienced the same growth in 
exports as Portugal (a country of similar size and per capita income), the recession 
would have been much shallower and the government would have found it much 
easier to achieve a primary surplus as tax revenues would have been much higher.  
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Figure 1 below shows the evolution of total exports of (non-fuel) goods and services 
for Portugal and Greece. Until 2008 both countries seemed to experience solid growth. 
However, in the case of Greece this was due to the commodity-price boom of those 
years, which artificially increased the recorded value of commodity exports (such as 
copper and aluminium) and the associated increase in freight rates. Since 2007-08, 
Greek exports have been flat, whereas those of Portugal have grown substantially, as 
mentioned above. The cumulative difference over the last six years amounts to over 
13% of Greek GDP. With Portuguese-style export growth, the fall in GDP would have 
been less than one half. Moreover, government revenues would be at least 6% of GDP 
higher (given that taxes take about 45% of GDP), which would have made it easy for 
the government to achieve the primary surplus foreseen by the original adjustment 
programme. 
 
Figure 1. Exports of goods and services: Greece vs Portugal 
Many commentators and the Greek government itself argue that exports cannot grow 
due to a lack of credit. The ongoing credit crunch in Greece must indeed constitute an 
obstacle to export growth, but the importance of the phenomenon has been overstated. 
Enterprises in Portugal were apparently able to increase their exports considerably 
although that country also experienced a serious credit crunch at the height of the 
crisis. Moreover, in regular surveys by the World Economic Forum about the 
availability of credit, one finds that this is indeed perceived as an obstacle, but the 
difference between Greece and Portugal is minor (see Figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2. Ease of access to credit: Greece vs Portugal 
 
 
The only other important case in which the standard approach of fiscal consolidation 
coupled with lower wage costs plus reforms to stimulate exports has not worked is 
that of Argentina. This country defaulted on its foreign debt in 2002, and broke a 
decade-long 1:1 peg to the US dollar. Unfortunately, Greece resembles Argentina in 
two key respects. 
Both countries have only a small exporting sector, which made the external adjustment 
much more difficult. And, both countries have an export structure tilted towards 
commodities whose supply is unlikely to react much to either structural reforms or 
lower wages.i 
This similarity does not mean that Greece is doomed to follow the path of Argentina 
and default as well. But policy-makers need to realise that it takes time to build a new 
export sector basically from scratch. They should concentrate talks on how to stimulate 
exports, rather than discussing only the budget. 
 
 
 
i Argentina experienced a sharp turnaround after its ‘Argexit’ in 2002, because commodity prices started 
to increase soon thereafter. The huge increase in grain prices, and that of oil, over the next few years 
paid for an extended period of increasing living standards and unorthodox policies. But all of this was 
due to the global commodity boom driven by China. The huge devaluation of the peso did not improve 
export performance, on the contrary. During the decade before the devaluation (when the peso had 
been linked 1:1 to the USD), real export growth had averaged 9% per annum. Over the next decade it 
fell to only 3.3% although global trade growth remained close to 6%. Moreover, there was no 
diversification in the structure of exports, which remains concentrated in commodities. 
                                                   
